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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 94-0369 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2-3 (i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
The court should review this case using an " abuse of 
discretion" standard, State vs. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 
422, (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case is governed in part by Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which was at the time of the plea codified as 
Title 77, Chapter, 35, Section 11(e), Utah Code Annotated. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's denial of a 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea submitted by the defendant/ 
appellant on the 9th of June, 1994. The motion was denied by two 
separate rulings; one dated June 29, 1994 and a supple-
mentary ruling dated July 12, 1994. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Defendant/Appellant was charged in the Eighth District 
Court for Uintah County, State of Utah on the 18th of February, 
1986 with two counts of Aggravated Kidnapping in violation of 
Section 76-5-302 Utah Code Annotated. Each count also provided a 
Firearms Enhancement Provision pursuant to Section 76-3-23 Utah 
Code. On February 26, 1986 the Defendant/Appellant plead guilty 
to Count One of the Information. Count Two of the Information was 
dismissed. The record does not reveal that any affidavit was used 
to assist the court in an explanation of Defendant/appellant's Rule 
11(e) rights at the time of plea. After a colloquy with the 
Honorable Richard Davidson, the court accepted the guilty plea. 
The matter came before the court for sentencing on the 26th day of 
March, 1986, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell presiding. The 
defendant/appellant was sentenced to a minimum mandatory sentence 
at the Utah State Prison of 15 years to life with a firearm 
enhancement requiring an additional 5 to 10 years to be served 
consecutively with the 15 years to life sentence. On May 20, 1987 
at the request of the Chairman of the Board of Pardons, the court 
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reviewed the Defendant/appellant's sentence. The court, the 
Honorable Dennis Draney presiding, re-affirmed the sentence 
originally imposed. On June 9, 1994, Defendant filed a Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea before the Eighth District Court. All the 
prior judges having retired, resigned, or being deceased, the case 
was re-assigned to the Honorable John Anderson. Judge Anderson 
issued a summary ruling with no response from the State of Utah on 
June 29, 1994 denying all aspects of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty plea excepting for a response by the State the issue of an 
inadequate explanation of the firearms enhancement. After 
considering the State's response, on July 12, 1994 Judge Anderson 
issued a ruling denying the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea in its entirety stating that the court had substantially 
complied with the requirements of Rule 11(e). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
is in error. The court made no findings that the appellant waived 
his right to self incrimination. The court made no findings that 
the appellant understood the nature and elements of the crime and 
that his plea admitted each and every element. The court 
incorrectly advised the defendant as to the maximum sentence which 
could be imposed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE IT FAILED TO 
COMPLY WITH RULE 11(e) OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect 
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at the time appellant made his guilty plea as codified in 77-35-
11(e) provided as follows: 
The court . . . shall not accept a (plea of guilty) 
until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel 
he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made: 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to 
confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all 
of those rights: 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea; 
that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving ecah of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements. 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence that may be imposed upon him for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what 
agreement has been reached. 
The record of the entry of pleas is very limited. Prom the 
record, it appears that no plea affidavit was used, therefore the 
court can only determined the trial court's compliance with rule 
11 (e) based on the oral representations made in open court. 
That record is bereft of any discussion with the appellant on 
several critical points included in the rule. There is no 
discussion whatsoever with the appellant concerning his right 
against compulsory self incrimination as required by subsection (3) 
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of the rule. There is no discussion of the nature and elements of 
the offense of aggravated kidnapping with a firearms enhancement 
as required by Subsection 4 of the rule. There is no discussion 
or record that the guilty pleas was an admission to each of the 
elements of the alleged crime as recuired by subsection 4 (Record, 
PP 4-7). 
The record also reveals that the trial judge affirmative mis-
representated to the appellant the maximum sentence possible as a 
result of the plea. Subsection 5 of the rule required a finding 
that the defendant understands both the minimum and maximum 
possible sentence. At line 12, page 7 of the record, the trial 
judge informed the appellant that a one to five year enhancement 
was possible in addition to the five years to life he originally 
explained. No correction of that error was made. The appellant 
was sentenced to a five to ten year firearm enhancement in direct 
contradiction to what had been explained. 
The standard of review as previously stated is that of an 
abuse of discretion by the court. The companion cases of Warner 
v. Morris, 709 P. 2d 309 (Utah, 1985) and Brooks v. Morris 709 P. 
2d 310, (Utah, 1985), established the standard by which a trial 
court accepts guilty pleas. The Supreme Court stated that a 
failure of to advise a defendant of his right concerning self-
incrimination was not alone sufficient to invalidated a guilty plea 
provided that the record as a whole showed that the rule 11 
requirements were substantially complied with. Subsequently the 
Supreme Court in State v. Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah, 1987) 
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replaced the "substantial compliance" rule with a "strict 
compliance" standard. It has been ruled that the Gibbons rule was 
not retroactive, however the concepts set forth in Gibbons are 
useful. In Gibbons the court stated that the trial court may not 
rely on defense counsel or affidavits to satisfy the specific 
requirements of Rule 11(e). In his case, where there is no 
affidavit, the court has a situation much more akin to Gibbons 
factually than might typically be the case. 
The case most similar to this which has reached the appellate 
courts is that of State v. Vasilacopulas, 756 P. 2d 92 (Utah App. 
1988). The Utah Court of Appeals, using the Warner-Brooks test 
found that an absence of discussion concerning the possibility of 
consecutive sentences, and a failure to find that the defendant 
understood that possibility showed a failure to substantially 
comply with Rule 11(e). That alone was sufficient to mandate a 
reversal of the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to 
withdraw guilty plea. The court did not consider a failure to 
comply with Rule 11(e)(4), citing the failure to comply with the 
sentencing portions of the rule as being sufficient. It can be 
presumed that if there had been a problem with an explanation of 
the elements of the offense as there was in this ca^e, the 
Vasilacopulos Court could have only made its decision stronger. 
It is also interesting to note that one of the concurring judges 
in Vasilacopulos was Richard Davidson, the trial judge who took the 
plea in this case. 
In this case, we have three major failures to even discuss 
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rights required by the rule. While the Warner and Brooks cases 
state that a failure to explain the right of self incrimination was 
not fatal in light of the record, the record there was more 
complete than here. Here as well, we have not only a failure to 
inform appellant of the maximum sentence, but a misrepresentation 
by the court as to the maximum sentence. When coupled with the 
failure to discuss the elements of the offense, the combination is 
fatal to the trial court's ruling that the requirements had been 
substantially complied with. Finally, even though there was some 
discussion of some of the Rule 11 requirements at the time the 
plea was entered, no findings were made except that the plea was 
knowingly made. (Record, p 8). 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case shows affirmative mistakes by the 
court in the taking of appellant's plea. It does not show strict 
compliance, substantial compliance, or anything approaching the 
required standard. Appellant hereby prays that the court reverse 
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw guilty plea and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
Dated this ^ 0 day of ^Cj^McjyhXf 1995. 
Alan M. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a three true and correct copies of the 
foregoing brief were mailed or hand delivered to Jan Grahan, 
attorney for appellee, at 236 State Capital on this <->/T day of 
JciMXUL^ . 1995. 
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EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, VERNAL DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
CASE NO.: 86CR14 
The Court has received and carefully reviewed the Pleadings filed by the Pro se 
Defendant, Wayne S. Tippett, in the above-captioned matter. 
The claim that the Information was erroneous is without merit. Defendant was 
charged per the statute and the Pleading is dismissed as frivolous on its face. The Court will 
note, however, from carefully reviewing the file that although the arraignment hearing 
actually took place in the District Court by docket entry on February 26, 1986, the Court 
Reporter's transcript inaccurately reflects the Arraignment date as January 26, 1986. 
Since the case at the Arraignment hearing was Pre State vs. Gibbons. 740 P2d 1309 
(Utah 1987), general compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was 
the appropriate standard. In carefully reviewing the Arraignment transcript, the Arraignment 
Judge complied with Rule 11 so as to apprise Defendant of his Constitutional rights and of 
the consequences of entering his guilty plea. 
The Motion for a New Trial and for Evidentiary Hearing has determined to be in the 
nature of a Rule 65 (B) Petition and the Court dismisses the complaints about Arraignment 
advice as being frivolous. 
The Court, however, in carefully reviewing the Arraignment transcript will note and 
does have some concern about the Arraignment Judge's instructions on the maximum 
penalties for the firearm enhancements. That issue is referred to the Uintah County 
Attorney's Office for response by written Pleading within 23 days for further consideration 
by the Court. 
DATED this w day of June, 1994 
'JOHN R. ANDERSON, DIST OURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 3 o *h day of June, 1994, true and copies of the Ruling 
were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Ms. JoAnn B. Stringham, Uintah 
County Attorney, at 152 East 100 North, Vernal, UT 84078 and to Mr. Wayne S. Tippett, 
Defendant, at Central Utah Correctional Facility, 255 East 300 North, P.O. Box 355, 
Gunnison, UT 84634. 
VKuulVjMlry 
Cheryl We^ks/Deputy Clerk 
EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, VERNAL DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE S. TIPPETT, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RULING 
CASE NO.: 86CR14 
The Court having initially dismissed all of the elements of the Defendant's Petition 
for the reasons stated in its Ruling dated June 29, 1994 except for the issue of the Court's 
instruction concerning the Firearm Enhancement sentence; that matter having been referred 
to the State for a response. The Court having carefully read the Memorandum submitted by 
the State and having seen no response from the Defendant determines as a matter of law that 
the general requirements of Rule 11 were met by the arraignment Judge in this case. 
The Court determines that there are no substantial issues of fact to warrant a hearing 
and that, as a matter of law, the Firearm Enhancement sentence that was imposed was in 
compliance with both the Information filed in the case and with the information given to the 
Defendant at the arraignment hearing, given the fact that it was only in the Defendant's mind 
and knowledge that there were multiple prior firearm convictions. 
This will be a final Order dismissing in its entirety the Petition for Relief filed by 
Wayne S. Tippett. 
DATED this JQL day of July, 1994. 
BYT 
OHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the I c ^ ^ day of July, 1994, true and correct copies of the 
Supplemental Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Ms. JoAnn B. 
Stringham, Uintah County Attorney, at 152 East 100 North, Vernal, UT 84078 and to 
Wayne S. Tippett, Defendant, at c/o Central Utah Correctional Facility, 225 East 300 North, 
P.O. Box 355, Gunnison, UT 84634. 
\|K\AMA\A|,U,UI 
Cheryl ^Veeks/Deputy Clerk 
